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Payment of Punitive Damages by
Insurance Companies
Martin G. Lentz*
T HE CONCEPT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES has become firmly en-
trenched in American tort history. As early as 1910 puni-
tive damages were awarded for gross negligence in the operation
of an automobile.1 Since that date a constantly increasing num-
ber of jurisdictions has allowed their recovery.2
The award of punitive damages is generally based upon the
concept of deterrence of, and punishment for, conduct of an out-
rageous nature. To justify punitive damages the circumstances
surrounding a tort must indicate such socially unreasonable con-
duct as to constitute a wilful or wanton, almost deliberate, dis-
regard of the legally protected interests of another.3
The Controversy
Originally the chief controversy about punitive damages
centered around the question of whether or not they might be
awarded in a vicarious liability situation wherein the master,
through no wrongful conduct of his own, is responsible for the
misconduct of his servant. The vast majority of the courts have
held the employer liable for such damages. This is particularly
true where there is a corporation involved since it is capable of
acting only through its agents.
4
In recent years a persuasive and prevailing view has been
*B.S.E., John Carroll Univ.; Police Officer, City of Cleveland Heights,
Ohio; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-
Wallace College.
I Buford v. Hopewell, 140 Ky. 666, 131 S. W. 502 (1910).
2 62 A. L. R. 2d 813 (1958).
3 McCormick, Damages, 278 (1935); Oleck, Damages to Persons & Property,
c. 26 (rev. ed., 1961).
4 D. L. Fair Lumber Co. v. Weems, 196 Miss. 201, 16 So. 2d 770 (1944);
Sovereign WOW v. Roland, 232 Ala. 541, 168 So. 576 (1936); Peterson v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 75 Minn. 368, 77 N. W. 985 (1899); Knoblock
v. Morris, 169 Kan. 540, 220 P. 2d 171 (1950); Bush v. Watkins, 224 Miss.
238, 80 So. 2d 19 (1955); Planters Wholesale Grocery v. Kincade, 210 Miss.
712, 50 So. 2d 578 (1951); Teche Lines Inc. v. Pope, 175 Miss. 393, 166 So.
539 (1936); Dickson v. Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Co., 161 S. C. 297, 159
S. E. 625 (1931).
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followed in the awarding of punitive damages against intoxicated
drivers.5
Assuming that both of these views continue to be held, we
can expect an ever increasing storm of disputation centering
around whether or not a liability insurer must respond for puni-
tive damages awarded against an insured tortfeasor. This re-
newed controversy is inevitable with the universal acceptance of
liability insurance coverage in recent years.
The Vexing Question
The insurance industry's argument is that if an irresponsible
wrongdoer were permitted to shift the burden of punitive dam-
ages to an insurance company, then no useful purpose would be
served.6 It has been further argued that a liability insurer can
be held responsible for punitive damages only under two condi-
tions. These conditions are as follows: (1) as a matter of con-
tract or policy construction the carrier has undertaken such an
obligation, and (2) if so, the contract is not void as against pub-
lic policy.
The more valid of the two arguments advanced by the insur-
ance companies and their proponents is that of contract or policy
construction.
Most personal and auto liability policies expressly exclude
coverage for intentional misconduct, without mentioning punitive
damages specifically. Typical among the auto liability policies is
that issued by the Progressive Mutual Insurance Company of
Cleveland, Ohio. 7 On the face of the policy, bodily injury or
property damage caused intentionally by, or at the direction of,
the insured is specifically excludeds In the absence of any state
statute controlling or regulating the subject matter of the con-
tract, the instrument would therefore be a contract. 9
5 Sebastian v. Wood, 246 Ia. 94, 66 N. W. 2d 841 (1954); Lazenby v. Univer-
sal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S. W. 2d 1 (1964); General
Casualty Co. v. Woodby, 238 F. 2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956).
6 Appleman, Insurance and Practice, 4312 (1962); McNeely, Illegality as a
Factor in Insurance, 41 Col. L. Rev. 26 (1941); Oleck, op. cit. supra, n. 3, at
Sec. 275C.
7 Progressive Mutual Auto Policy (Form AFC-100 2-65).
8 Id. at Part 1-Liability, Exclusions (b).
9 Buffalo Pressed Steel Co. v. Kirwan, 138 Md. 60, 113 A. 628, (1921); Mex-
ican Petroleum Corp. of Louisiana v. North German Lloyd, D. C. La., 17 F.
2d 113, 114 (La. 1926).
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The Distinction in the Line of Contract Cases
In order to intelligently evaluate the validity of the argu-
ments advanced on the contract basis by the insurance industry
proponents we must understand that the cases most frequently
cited by them fall into the category of intentional torts, such as
assault and battery, which require a specific intent on the part
of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's person. 10
Typical among these cases is that of Abbott v. Western Na-
tional Indemnity Co. in which the insurer was not held liable
for the payment of punitive damages awarded against an insured
who while in a drunken state thoroughly trounced the victim."
The policy expressly excluded coverage for intentional mis-
conduct.
It is conceded that the assault and battery type tort re-
quires intent of a nature which constitutes an exclusion under
the intentional misconduct clause in the policy.
The Fallacy in the Argument
It is when the proponents of the non-payment of punitive
damages attempt to extend the sound reasoning of the inten-
tional tort exclusion, as it applies to the contract interpretation,
to other factual situations that their arguments become illogical
and misleading.
In Morrell v. LaLonde, a malpractice case, a doctor while
attempting surgery did an unbelievably bad job; and to make
matters worse, he discharged the patient from his private hos-
pital while she was still desperately in need of medical care.
12
Rhode Island procedure permitted the insurance carrier to be
properly joined with the doctor as a defendant. The jury ap-
parently became outraged at the unprofessional conduct of the
defendant and they awarded compensatory and punitive dam-
ages in a vengeful fashion. Although the insurance company
had specifically agreed to indemnify against loss from liability
imposed by law, it denied that it was legally responsible to pay
punitive damages. The court held that the insurance company
was obligated to pay the damages in dispute under the terms of
the policy.
10 Prosser, Torts, 40 (3d ed. 1964).
11 165 Cal. App. 302, 331 P. 2d 997 (1958).
12 45 R. I. 112, 120 Atl. 435 (1923).
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The facts of the Morrell case indicate the type of outrageous
wrongdoing that evidences such a conscious and deliberate dis-
regard of the interests of others that it may properly be termed
wilful, wanton, or reckless.'l
There is a distinction between specific intent as required to
constitute assault and battery and so called quasi-intent. 14 The
latter establishes the type of negligence which is known as wil-
ful, wanton, or reckless.15 Specific intent, being an intentional
tort, is excluded under the intentional misconduct clause in most
policies,16 whereas wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct supports
the awarding of punitive damages. 7
In Pennsylvania Thresherman and Farmers Mutual Casualty
Company v. Thornton, the court, recognizing this distinction,
held that wilful or wanton negligence supporting punitive dam-
ages is not the same as wilful conduct such as is present in as-
sault and battery.'
Having Established the Distinction
Once it is recognized that there is a difference between spe-
cific intent constituting intentional misconduct (wherein a per-
son intends a result and acts for the purpose of accomplishing
it), and wilful, wanton, or reckless misconduct (sometimes
termed quasi-intent) wherein a person acts under the actual or
constructive realization that he is causing great risk to another,
then insight into the question of whether the contract or policy
construction excludes the payment of punitive damages is greatly
enhanced. 19
It seems to be well settled, under contract construction,
that the insurance company does not have to pay punitive or
"exemplary" damages when under the exclusion section of the
policy such damages are specifically named and it is clearly
stated that there is no obligation for indemnification. 20 It is
13 Sebastian v. Wood, supra note 5 (Driving While Intoxicated); Prosser,
Torts, 10 (3d ed. 1964).
14 Prosser, Torts, 188 (3d ed. 1964).
15 Ibid.
16 Notes 10 and 11 supra.
17 McCormick, op. cit. supra note 3; Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 3, at Sec. 275C.
18 244 F. 2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); also see Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters
Ins. Co., supra note 5.
19 Elliot, Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. Calif. L. Rev. 91 (1933) for a good
discussion of the subject.
20 See discussion supra.
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equally settled that punitive damages which are returned against
an insured in connection with intentional misconduct (such as
assault and battery, malicious prosecution, conversion and se-
duction) are not required to be paid by the insurance carrier.
Injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the
direction of the insured is specifically excluded in the standard-
ized liability policy as discussed above.
On the positive side of the standard liability insurance con-
tract, noting the exclusion above, the insurance carrier agrees to
indemnify the insured for all sums that he shall become legally
obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by
law, for damages sustained by any person. 21
The distinction between simple negligence and negligence
upon which an award for punitive damages can be made is a
delicate one. Compensatory damages can be based on the same
type of negligence that supports punitive damages. If an insured
had a judgment returned against him for compensatory damages
based on wilful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, there is no
question that the insurance company would be obligated to
pay.22
Under the contract interpretation of the standardized insur-
ance policy, which excludes coverage for intentional misconduct
but does not specifically mention punitive damages, there is a
consensus among the courts that as a matter of contract con-
struction and interpretation such provision indemnifies the in-
sured for punitive as well as compensatory damages. 23
The insurance industry and its proponents argue that public
policy absolutely prohibits indemnification against liability for
punitive damages whether or not they are expressly covered by
the insurance contract. Some jurisdictions have adopted this
view.24
21 Progressive Mutual Auto Policy, op. cit. supra note 7; also, Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice, 4312, at 132 (1962).
22 Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., supra note 5.
23 Appleman, op. cit. supra note 6; also Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S. C. 200,
139 S. E. 2d 908 (1965); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Finance Co., 75 F. 2d
58 (8th Cir. 1934); U. S. Fed. & Guar. Co. v. Janich, 3 F. R. D. 16, 19 (Cal.
1943): For a contra holding see Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96
Colo. 10, 17, 39 P. 2d 776, 779 (1934).
24 Northwestern National Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F. 2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962);
Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A. 2d 357 (1941).
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Public Policy
Having considered the contract or policy construction phase
of the problem we are confronted with a very important consid-
eration, this being whether or not public policy prohibits the
indemnification of the insured for punitive damages when the
contract construction is not a bar.
Public policy embraces the principle that no person can law-
fully do that which is injurious to, or against the public good.
Included in this is the principle under which the ability to con-
tract is limited by law for the good of the community.2 5
Typical of the arguments against insurance companies pay-
ing punitive damages is that advanced by the court in North-
western National Cas. Company v. McNulty.26 The court, in re-
versing a summary judgment against the insurer, decided that
the law of Virginia, where the policy was issued, governed the
question whether insurance against punitive damages was against
public policy. The character of the damages had been determined
in Florida which was the state in which the accident occurred
and where the judgment for punitive damages had been ren-
dered. The court in the case at hand made it clear, however, that
the decision would have been the same if Florida or Virginia law
governed, as Florida and Virginia law are in harmony concern-
ing the theory that punitive damages should be awarded for pun-
ishment and deterrence (emphasis) and should rest ultimately
as well as nominally on the party actually responsible for the
wrong. The court then went on to say that such damages do not
compensate the plaintiff for his injuries since he has already been
made whole by compensatory damages.
In regard to the question of public policy the court felt that
to allow punitive damages would (1) produce a serious conflict
of interest between the insurance carrier and the insured in re-
gard to settlement negotiations and trial tactics, (2) tend to nur-
ture a conflict between the rule that insurance may not be re-
ferred to in the presence of the jury and the fact that the finan-
cial standing of the defendant may be considered by the jury in
assessing punitive damages, and (3) permit extravagant and un-
real results which would have no relation to making the injured
party whole.
25 See Black's Law Dictionary, 1317 (4th ed., 1951).
26 Supra note 24.
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The court in pursuing the public policy argument against
insurance carriers being liable for punitive damages cited the
cases of Edwards v. Nulsen and Livesy v. Stock as examples of
the unrealistic results arrived at by juries when they go beyond
the area of compensatory damages.2 7 In both of those cases the
plaintiff was awarded a nominal amount for compensatory dam-
ages as compared with the much larger amount for punitive dam-
ages. Along this same line of reasoning an even more extreme
example of the punitive damage award being far in excess of the
compensatory award, although not cited by the court in the
Northwestern case, is that of Finney v. Lockhart28 wherein a ver-
dict of one dollar actual and two thousand in punitive damages
was returned in an unfair competition action.
The opponents of the idea of insurance carriers being liable
for punitive damages cite the results arrived at in the Edwards,
Livesy, and Finney cases as sound reasons for the justification
of such damages when the wrongdoer is the one who pays. 29
Since public policy embraces the principle that no person
can lawfully do that which is injurious to or against the public
good, we must carefully weigh the validity of the insurance
industry's arguments as they apply to the best interest of the
public.
In the Northwestern Casualty Co. case the court, in the
consideration of public policy, went on to say that the end-
object of punitive damages, punishment and deterrence of out-
rageous conduct on the part of potential defendants, would be
frustrated if the accused were allowed to shift his burden to the
innocent insurance carrier and ultimately to the public, since
the added cost imposed by this liability would be passed along
to the premium holders. 0 According to this court, society would
then in a sense be punishing itself for the tortious conduct of the
insured. The doctrine regarding public policy adopted by the
court in the Northwestern case is unreal in that it does not take
into consideration the injured party to whom the question of
public good also applies.
27 347 Mo. 1077, 152 S. W. 2d 28 (1941); and 208 Cal. 315, 281 P. 70 (1929).
28 35 Cal. 2d 161, 217 P. 2d 19 (1955).
29 Edwards v. Nulsen; Livesy v. Stock, supra note 27; Finney v. Lockhart,
supra note 28.
30 Northwestern National Cas. Co. v. McNulty, supra note 24.
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In the case of Pennsylvania Thresherman and Farmers Mu-
tual Casualty Company v. Thornton31 the court reasoned that
public policy properly analyzed reveals that liability insurance
is as much for the protection of the injured party as for the pro-
tection of the insured. The court based its decision on sound
reasoning. For the court to have arrived at a contrary holding
would lead to an untenable position. One must consider the pur-
pose and spirit of insurance policies which are designed not only
to indemnify the insured against loss, but also to protect mem-
bers of the public.32 To allow the insurance carrier to escape
payment of punitive damages under the guise of public policy
would in essence adhere to a doctrine that the more extreme the
recklessness the more likely the carrier to escape liability.33
In a recent case, Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insur-
ance Company, 4 Justice Dyer ruled that an insurance carrier is
obligated to pay both compensatory and punitive damages claims
against an insured who had an accident while driving in an in-
toxicated state and that the insurance contract so construed was
not against public policy.
The reasoning of that court is in accordance with that of the
court in the Pennsylvania Thresherman Casualty Company
case.
35
In both the Lazenby and Pennsylvania Thresherman cases
the treatment of public policy given by the courts is praise-
worthy. The courts came to grips with the problem and declined
to follow contrary authority. Both of these decisions have for-
tified the growing and persuasive view that public policy does
not prohibit insurance carriers from paying punitive damages.
Conclusion
The logic and validity of the public policy argument that to
require insurance companies to pay punitive damages would
place a burden upon the innocent insurance carrier, and ulti-
mately the public itself, is weak and indefensible.
31 244 F. 2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
32 McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Insurance, 41 Col. L. Rev. 26 (1941).
33 See Huntington Cab Co. v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., 155 F.
2d 117 (4th Cir. 1946).
34 Supra note 5.
35 Supra note 31.
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Juries are never required to give punitive damages; and
even when they may properly award them, they must be charged
that they are at liberty to withhold them entirely. Some law-
yers even refrain from requesting a punitive damage instruction,
based on the calculated risk that the awarding of them might
constitute reversible error. There does not seem to be a growing
trend for juries to award such damages with a vengeance and
in a heedless fashion. On the contrary, the trend seems to be for
juries to award punitive damages only when the facts of the case
indicate that they are well deserved.
Insurance rates are spiraling and this certainly can not be
attributed to the small number of cases in which insurance car-
riers have been required to indemnify an insured for punitive
damages.
If the passion of the jury is inflamed by the outrageous con-
duct of the defendant, even when it has not been charged on
punitive damages, it will be inclined to reflect its outrage in the
award given under the guise of actual or compensatory damages.
Since the insurance rates are based on total cost figures, it
is reasonable to assume that in a sense punitive damages are
already part of the rate structure.
The concern for not wanting to punish the insurance carrier,
an innocent party, is not logical since any insurance company is
an innocent party. The involvement is based on the contractual
relationship of indemnification.
If an insurance company does not wish to indemnify for
punitive damages, then it should specifically exclude such cover-
age in the policy. In the absence of such a specific exclusion,
public policy properly analyzed requires it to pay.
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